The Mekong River Commission: A Mandate to Spectate

Decisiveness, action, results. Like many other westerners, I prefer directness and a goal oriented approach. In Asia, I often find myself frustrated by the round-about way that relationships or status is adhered to and respects given before any attention is devoted to addressing the larger issue. I understand the importance of observing cultural traditions, yet the resulting inefficiency often leaves me frustrated. In many places it is impossible to get a firm “yes”, and as I found in China,”maybe”, always means no. While visiting the Mekong River Commission (MRC), I found myself contemplating various cultural aspects that could influence the MRC’s effectiveness, but ultimately arrived at the conclusion that culture is too diverse and vague to provide a convincing argument. If it is not culture that ultimately explains the MRC’s inability to slow down or prevent the potentially catastrophic mainstream dams that are being built along the lower Mekong, what is it then? What is hindering decisiveness, action, and constraining environmental conservation efforts? It is the MRC’s mandate to spectate.

Our stay in Vientiene, the “capital village” of Laos, saw our group delve into the environmental and geo-political implications of lower Mekong hydropower development. The foremost authority on the technical and political issues facing this region’s water resources and environment is the MRC. We were fortunate enough to secure a meeting at MRC headquarters with one of their representatives. Having already born witness to China’s impact on the Mekong through its wreckless and unchecked cascade of dams, our group was hoping  to hear a positive outlook for the Mekong’s future development. What we got was the representative’s effort to portray a prosperouse future for the Mekong and an active role for the MRC, but for those of us looking for greater talk of sustainable development commitments and a more cautious approach to large-scale hydropower development, we left extremely dissapointed.

When it comes to environmental protection and sustainable development, China is an easy and often times deserving target for criticism. Even though a significant portion of the Mekong River flows through China, it has refused to become a member of the MRC and is merely a “dialogue partner”. China, as part of what I like to call its practice of “International Collaboration with Chinese Characteristics”, has again chosen one-sided selfishness by refusing to disclose water data, reservoir levels, and other development information with downstream countries. Our group experienced China’s oversensitive paranoia with regards to its hydropower projects first hand. After much effort and inquiry as to whether it was even possible for our group to get close to the Jing Hong Dam, we were bluntly told that, “muslims and/or foreigners are not allowed to visit or approach the dam complex”. At least the Chinese authorities were direct…

The MRC representative that we met with also refused to say anything negative with regards to China and its impact on the lower Mekong countries. We were always left with the ambiguous answer, “relations with China are evolving and stalled by a complicated domestic political situation”. This answer was an easy and effective way of deflecting China related questions. By blaming China’s obstinance and refusal to partake as a full MRC member on the country’s internal politics, the representative successfully avoided attributing any blame on China for inadequate dialouge or any other shortcomings.

Only after several students asked about the negative environmental and social impacts of mainstream Mekong dams, like the Xayaburi and Don Sahong projects, did we fully begin to understand the source of the MRC’s inability to influence the regions development, it’s mandate. Time and again we were given the answer, “the MRC cannot (insert any type of action here)…because the MRC is an advisory body, not a regulatory agency. If it is not in our mandate, then we cannot do it”. The MRC has become an organization that provides technical cooperation and acts as a platform for dialogue on water resource management issues. Technical assistance and dialogue are important and certainly needed when it comes to complicated transboundary water resources issues, but is research and discussion enough? Is this enough to slow down damaging projects with irreversible impacts that will do more harm than good? It isn’t.

The MRC representative proudly discussed a $400-million dollar redesign of the Xayburi Dam as proof that MRC facilitated dialouge is leading to positive outcomes. The Vientiene Times, a state run newspaper, has gone so far as to start referrinig to the Xayaburi Dam as a “run of river” hydropower project. A “run of river” dam is one that does not impede the flow of the river, and therefore, does not create a massive reservoir that damages the environment and displaces people. If this redesign has indeed prevented the creation of a reservoir and avoided irreversible environmental damage I will be thoroughly impressed, but I highly doubt that this is the case. The Thai investors in Xayaburi need to recoup their money, the Lao government needs to have this project completed on time, and the other clauses written in the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) need to be met. Accomplishing all of this with a truly “run of river” design and maintaining the ability to generate the specified amount of energy, to my knowledge, is not possible. The words “run of river” and a large-scale hydropower project like Xayaburi, are anything but synonymous.

When it comes to Xayaburi and the MRC, what has actually happened is far from the story that the representative attempted to portray. International law and the Mekong Agreement prohibit MRC member governments from implementing a project while the other national governments are still discussing it—this is part of the obligation to negotiate “in good faith.” However, Laos and Thai developers started implementing the Xayaburi Dam in late 2010 before the Mekong governments met to discuss the project and before further studies requested by Cambodia and Vietnam to determine the transboundary impact of the project even commenced. Laos has violated the Mekong Agreement, made false claims that Xayaburi is environmentally sustainable, and ignored the general consensus amongst fishery experts that its proposed mitigation measures for fishery impacts are unlikely to work. Despite continued calls for further research and dialogue, the same story is now repeatinig itself with the Don Sahong Dam, a mere 3km up from the Laos border with Cambodia. All of this is happening while the MRC adheres to its mandate to spectate.

So if the MRC is bound by its mandate as an “advisory body”, what should its future role be if it is unable to slow down or stop damaging large-scale hydropower development? The chances of MRC member countries sacrificing any semblence of sovereignty to give the MRC a stronger mandate are slim to none. The MRC will certainly continue its technical assistance and dialogue, but going forward I hope that the MRC will devote greater effort and resources towards helping the most vulnerable and impoverished people along the Mekong. These are individuals that desperately need help adapting to an array of climatic changes, threats to their livelihoods, and the other impacts of large-scale hydropower development. The MRC is by no means an implementer of development projects, yet they must work to find a role for themselves within this community that is working to ensure a better future for those impacted by a changing Mekong River.

As the meeting with MRC came to a close I found myself thinking of the saying, “the ends justify the means”. This expression, a favorite of many U.S. politicians, serves to explain large-scale hydropower developers platform: that thousands of mega-watts (the ends) justifies projects that have negative environmental and social externalities (the means). Similar to how the United Nations (UN) rarely breaks its various peace keeping agreements, the MRC would never violate its mandate and do what is ultimately necessary to protect the Mekong River. But how many Rawandans, Darfurians, and Bosnians would be alive today if the UN had considered whether “the ends” of saving lives, justified “the means” of breaking a mandate to do so? Can we stand idly by and watch while the last remaining segments of untamed river are turned into reservoirs?

I do not claim to have a solution for the sustainable development of Mekong River water resources. Given our current economic model, the various systems of governance in place in this region, and China’s refusal to cooperate in the existing dialogue processes, I do not believe that there is a viable solution that will be able to deliver anything close to a future Mekong River that is ecologically healthy and resembles the turbulent river that it once was. Unfortunately, like the MRC, we all have a mandate to spectate the impending destruction of the Mekong River…